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　　前英国金融监管当局高官，Sir Howard Davis，昨日撰文讨论当前国际银行业标准面临的危机。2008年的金融危机后，金融稳定委员会（FSB）的建立和巴塞尔协议三（Basel III ）引进的更高的国际标准使全球银行业安全性得以提高。然而，当前出现了危险的兆头，即执行更高国际银行业标准的承偌和决心在弱化。许多国家表明上支持巴塞尔协议三，实际上都在采取措施保护自己的银行业，未来更高国际银行业标准能否执行存在着不确定性。

　　更具体地说，美国更强调银行的内部监管和风险控制，特朗普更暗示着将不会兑现国际承偌。而欧洲银行业认为他们的风险性本来就小，不太担心风险，于是更愿意发放贷款给业绩好的大公司。如果国际承偌不能得到有效兑现，很多国家将会引入本国当地标准，资本利用率将降低，整个银行系统将越发脆落，并可能导致新的全球金融不稳定。

　　Banking standards: treacherous political waters lie ahead

　　Hoard Davis

　　Wednesday 28 December 201609.21 GMT

　　The financial crisis of 2008 gave a big boost to the global standard-setters. Suddenly the Basel committee, which sets the standards for international banking supervision) was leading the financial news.

　　Dinner parties in Manhattan and Kensington were consumed with the finer points of Basel II and the evils of procyclical capital requirements. Governments that had been suspicious of international interference were eager for tougher rules to prevent banking crises from spilling across borders and infecting others.

　　The consequences of this enthusiasm were the creation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), born out of the ashes of the Financial Stability Forum, at the G20’s London summit in April 2009, and inclusion of representatives of all G20 members among the key rule-makers in Basel and elsewhere.

　　The G7’s domination gave way to the hope that broader membership would produce more comprehensive buy-in and stronger political support for increasing the banking system’s capital.

　　All this change has worked, up to a point. The Basel III regulations, for example, more than doubled the capital an individual bank should hold, and enhanced the quality of that capital. The system looks somewhat safer as a result. But now there are dangerous signs that the commitment to stronger global standards – indeed, to any common standards – may be on the wane.

　　Many predicted this trend, but for the wrong reason. Sceptics warned that it would be harder to reach agreement among 20 or more countries than it had been among the dozen pre-crisis Basel committee members (mainly European countries, with only the US, Canada, and Japan representing the world beyond).

　　In practice, that has not turned out to be a major problem. Basel III was agreed far more quickly than Basel II was. Political pressure from finance ministers, expressed through the FSB, proved effective.

　　In fact, recent tensions have been more old-fashioned, pitting the US against the eurozone, with the UK and others stuck in between. The US has been pressing for tighter controls on banks’ internal models, and for a limit on how much a bank’s models can reduce its assets on a risk-weighted basis.

　　Agreement on these so-called output floors has so far proved impossible. The Europeans argue that their banks’ corporate lending is inherently less risky. After all, EU banks lend more to higher-rated, large companies, which access US capital markets, rather than borrowing from banks.

　　They also hold more low-risk mortgages on their balance sheets, in the absence of a European equivalent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, America’s two quasi-public mortgage banks, which hoovered up securitised US mortgages.

　　At its meeting in Santiago, Chile, in November, the Basel committee conspicuously failed to agree on a solution, and kicked the issue upstairs to the committee of governors and heads of supervision, which will try again in January.

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